Year Five of the Great War: Empires Will Fall

The discussion featured Volodymyr Yelchenko (Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Ukraine, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN (1997–2000, 2015–2019), head of international policy research at the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation), Volodymyr Ohryzko (diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2007–2009), Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador, head of the Center for Russian Studies, one of the leading researchers of Russian policy in Ukraine), Vitaliy Savych (Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Hero of Ukraine), Olha Salo (Deputy Director General of the National Museum of the Revolution of Dignity (2018–2026), head of cultural initiatives at the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation), and Serhiy Sternenko (civic activist, volunteer, advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine). The discussion was moderated by Serhiy Stukanov, head of the civic organization “Institute of Unity,” with opening remarks delivered by Artem Mykolaichuk, Chairman of the Board of the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation.

Full VIDEO of the discussion: youtube.com

Artem Mykolaichuk: “The enemy is weaker and more frightened than ever before in years of war, even centuries”

Artem Mykolaichuk
Chairman of the Board of the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation

Last night and this morning, strike UAVs once again hit Russia’s energy and oil infrastructure. Everyone saw the photos of the spectacular cloud over Tuapse. You saw the series of explosions in Samara. I am sure you also saw the burning oil reservoirs. The sky over Muscovy is thick with toxic smoke. Russians are howling in fear and despair on social media. Frightened communists now fear a repeat of 1917 and are calling on everyone: “We must not let this happen again!”

The Ukrainian army has rewritten the textbooks on warfare. A drone costing a few hundred dollars destroys a tank worth a million. Maritime unmanned platforms have pushed Russians out of the northwestern part of the Black Sea. UAVs and missiles entirely made in Ukraine overcome enemy air defenses and fly thousands of kilometers deep into Russia. What seemed like futurology just five years ago is now happening before our eyes. The enemy is weakening. For the first time in years of war — even centuries — the enemy is this weak and frightened, searching for someone to blame for its disgraceful state.

But the Ukrainian phenomenon extends beyond military achievements. Researchers from the University of Colorado, the Central European University in Vienna, and universities in Norway and Germany are studying another phenomenon: how 1,469 Ukrainian communities prevented the state from collapsing. Parent committees, youth organizations, volunteer networks, doctors, and activists repurposed themselves for resistance. Trust built during peacetime became the infrastructure of survival in wartime. Finland is studying the Ukrainian model. Poland is building backup decision-making centers based on the Ukrainian example. The Baltic states are watching how local organizations transform into a crisis response system.

Of course, there are many problems. The fifth year of a bloody war. We are resisting a ruthless empire. We are resisting the second-largest army in the world. That is important to remember. And we are defeating this army. Unfortunately, about 20 percent of Ukraine is occupied. The Ukrainian information space is overloaded. We are constantly under attack: manipulations, provocations, information sabotage — not only from enemies but also from so-called friends. Today, our discussion features people for whom resisting the Russian empire is daily work.

Volodymyr Ohryzko: “We are on the eve of very interesting events — when the last empire in the northern hemisphere will finally fall”

Volodymyr Ohryzko
diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2007–2009), Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador, head of the Center for Russian Studies; one of the leading researchers of Russian policy in Ukraine

Why do empires fall? Because they internally cease to be effective, unable to maintain the image of strength they cultivated over years, decades, centuries. I recall the Soviet empire. I was still a young diplomat then, but I already understood perfectly that this empire was approaching its finale. It is hard to explain, but it was in the air. The system of governance had already rotted, becoming one that could no longer exist, yet by inertia continued a little longer. Like an avalanche in the mountains: a single pebble is enough to set the process in motion. That pebble was the GKChP. And what followed was the finale of this entire process. In military terms, there is a concept of a cumulative effect: when everything concentrates at one point and then pierces any armor — and that is the end.

Russia, the Russian Federation, is one way or another approaching its final stage of development. From what we can analyze and observe, Russia is in this eve of the finale. And this finale manifests in many ways. In my view, the most important of them (aside from economic processes) is that the repressive apparatus, which traditionally is the key element of any regime, in Russia is beginning to fail. The same thing happened with the KGB before the end of the Soviet Union. When certain internal processes had already begun, when things in the national republics went in directions that did not fit the all-Union framework, the repressive apparatus could no longer respond appropriately. Now the same thing is happening in Russia. When was it ever possible in Russia to protest, to record videos criticizing the tsar himself? And these are things that fit the framework, the format. And what is the FSB’s reaction, the special services’ reaction? None! For me, this is a sign that the connective link between “tsar” and “serfs” no longer works. And that means processes are beginning around the tsar that will one way or another lead to the finale. We do not know whether it will be tomorrow, in two months, or perhaps in six months. But the main elements that will add momentum to this context are two things. First — our democratic, “pink” drones and missiles. They are phenomenally democratizing what is happening in Russia today. And second — economic sanctions, which, albeit gradually and consistently, are bringing the Russian economy to a point where irreversible processes are beginning. We are on the eve of very interesting events — when the last empire in the northern hemisphere will finally fall.

Recently, it became known that some countries are asking us not to bomb Russian ports. What was Ukraine’s reaction? As General Budanov said, it was restrained. But the ports are burning. That is the response we need. They can ask us, but we must do our job, and do it calmly, purposefully.

We often talk about victory. But what is our victory? Do we have a strategy for relations with Russia? What do we want? Some want the borders of 2022, before the Great War. Some want 1991. And some are ready to stop at the current line of demarcation. We do not have a state strategy for relations with the still-existing Russia. But Russia has one — it is the destruction of Ukraine, the destruction of the Ukrainian people. They have it all written down and publicly declared.

Where is our strategy for relations with Russia? There is none. We have plenty of institutions, starting from the Institute of Strategic Studies and the National Security and Defense Council. We have plenty of brilliant minds, but no vision of what we want. And if you have no vision, where are you going? Left? Right? Straight? That is why we first need to formulate for ourselves what we want. My vision: I want the name “Russian Federation” to no longer exist on the political map of the world. Because the Russian Federation in any of its forms will be a threat to all neighbors and to the entire world. Therefore, our goal should be to ensure that this federation no longer exists.

An interesting point: a PACE session is currently underway. And one of the Russian “oppositionists,” Garry Kasparov, has initiated the signing of a so-called Strasbourg Declaration, where I read for the first time that they demand the Russian Federation either transform into a union of several states or, in principle, disintegrate. This is already a colossal step forward, at the very least in the minds of those people capable of thinking strategically.

So let us also think strategically and finally determine for ourselves what we want to see in place of the Russian Federation. If we know this, then the logic of our actions will be obvious. If the goal is to reach the borders of certain years — one strategy. If it is the elimination of this state — another. Then we need to think about how we interact with our colleagues who are still terrified at the very thought of Russia disintegrating.

Serhiy Sternenko: “By the end of this year, we will increase our strikes on Russia at least twofold”

Serhiy Sternenko
civic activist, volunteer, advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine

I often restrain myself in my formulations, but recently, watching what is happening with our adversary, I allowed myself to say: what we are observing now in Russia can be called a pre-revolutionary situation. Whether it will become a revolution or a coup, we will see. I believe we will live to see these wonderful times. Personally, I plan to outlive the Russian Federation. The situation in Russia is heading toward a point where the empire, sooner or later (and more likely sooner), will be forced to fall. Speaking of empirical data, here are the statistics: as of now, Russians are losing 2.1 times more personnel per kilometer of Ukrainian territory advanced compared to the same period in spring 2025. In other words, within one year, they have begun losing more than twice as many soldiers for each kilometer of Ukrainian territory they occupy.

The enemy’s spring-summer offensive campaign — I will not say it has failed yet, but it has encountered significant difficulties due to the considerable technological advantage of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which consists of two main components. First — our possession of communication systems like Starlink, while simultaneously denying the enemy access to these systems. This has caused quite serious consequences for the command and control of Russian forces directly along the line of contact and beyond. And second — the massive development of unmanned systems, uncrewed and ground-based robotic systems at absolutely all levels — tactical and strategic. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult for the enemy to execute its plans. I will not cite the figures for the contracting volumes of certain categories of UAVs that we have for this year: some contracts are already signed, some are awaiting signature. We are eagerly anticipating the unblocking of the European Union’s credit for Ukraine — so we can proceed with new procurements that I am confident will inflict even greater losses on the enemy. But these are very significant volumes. By the end of this year, we will increase our strikes on the Russian Federation at least twofold compared to the current period. And I am speaking only about deep strikes into the Russian Federation. There are also middle-strike attacks, delivered at a depth of up to three hundred kilometers. There are front-strike attacks, the development of tactical-level FPV drones, and so on. Therefore, the numbers suggest that even if Russia does not undergo disintegration processes this year, it will at the very least face enormous difficulties.

I do not have a center for studying Russia, but I do have a hobby — I research this federation. Including its narratives, propaganda, and how that highly atomized society in Russia lives. And I must say that Ukrainian deep-strike attacks have an enormous impact on the morale of our adversary. And morale is one of the defining categories in the defense capability of any army or nation. You can have plenty of weapons, plenty of soldiers, but if your soldiers are demoralized, if your country’s population is demoralized, none of that matters. And now we are observing serious demoralization of the Russian population. The unspoken social contract that existed for a long time under the so-called “Putin’s” Russian Federation has been broken — the deal was that Russians had basic security, basic economic growth (what they call stability). In return, the state does whatever it wants: launches new wars, throws people into paddy wagons, kills opponents of the regime. But now we observe that this worldview among Russians has been shattered, and this happened in a fairly short period of time — with the intensification of Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia. They see that they have significant economic problems, they face massive daily attacks deep into the country. And this will only intensify, raising the level of discontent. On this front, the Kremlin has turned out to be our ally: simultaneously with a host of problems, they decided to deprive Russians of internet access. It is amusing to watch their reaction, but this actually has far-reaching consequences. Any nation always fights more actively for a right it has been deprived of, one it has already experienced — for a good it has already received — than for something it has never seen or tried. Now even Kremlin and Vladimir Putin supporters do not understand what is happening, what all this is for. This combination of factors is accelerating positive developments inside our adversary.

There is no single factor capable of destroying an empire. I have not lived that many years and was not a witness to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but I have studied this topic extensively, as well as how empires have disintegrated in general. Typically, it is a mass of different problems that accumulate over time, to which the system does not react with appropriate speed or in an appropriate manner, and which at a certain point reach a critical mass. Can we win (and in my understanding, Ukraine’s victory must consist precisely in the disintegration of the Russian Federation, in its disappearance from the political map of the world) by killing 50,000 Russian servicemembers per month (and we are heading toward that)? By that alone — no. But can we create problems for the Russian army by destroying 50,000 military personnel? Yes. Can we exhaust the Russian army? We can. Can we create a situation where Russians face a critical shortage of personnel, and then perhaps paths for operational-depth breakthroughs will open? Possibly. We must create ever greater critical strain on the Russian military system. If the enemy currently mobilizes 25,000–28,000 personnel per month (until recently, by the way, these figures were 32,000–35,000), and we destroy significantly more, then they will become less capable — first of offensive, and then of defensive operations.

And if we also consider the reaction of Russian society to Ukrainian strikes, to internet restrictions, to the dire economic situation… The level of discontent within Russian society is gradually rising and will continue to rise if the current dynamics are maintained. And when favorable conditions arise to — I do not know — either kill Putin, or remove him, or for some other wonderful events in Russia, it is important that the critical mass of Russian amorphous, atomized society does not so much oppose these events as simply not interfere. Let it be indifferent to Russians. It seems to me that if Prigozhin were alive today, if he had not died earlier, these would be more favorable times for his march on Moscow. He started a bit too early. But I believe that in time, other leaders will emerge who will be able to create turmoil, as they themselves like to say, inside Russia.

Regarding interaction with Russia’s subjugated peoples, I agree that the problem is that we lack a clearly defined national strategy for engaging with our adversary. On the one hand. On the other, nothing prevents our special services, under current legislation, from working with Russian leaders who can organize protests.

Volodymyr Yelchenko: “Our efforts must be concentrated on a coalition of the willing. These are the countries that can pull us through”

Volodymyr Yelchenko
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Ukraine, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN (1997–2000, 2015–2019), head of international policy research at the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation

It was a strategic or tactical mistake to rely primarily on our partners and to think they would do everything for us. Who today remembers that peace summit? Unfortunately… With all due respect to its organizers, I said many times that I did not understand what this summit was for at all. Aside from a “family photo” featuring certain supporters of the state, it produced nothing. Much like Trump’s peace council, by the way. Many are now comparing these things. But Trump at least earned some $200 billion from it, as some believe. And we got absolutely nothing.

We had hoped that behind us would stand the United States, the EU, NATO countries plus Japan, Australia, South Korea — and then we could win. And we underestimated the role of what we call the Global South, which constitutes the majority of humanity and the majority in all international structures (except European or transatlantic ones). We have not yet managed to bring this voice to our side. These countries need to be engaged individually. They are very different: small, large, medium-sized. I also do not think we have managed to change China’s position. We do not have that kind of influence, and many mistakes were made even under previous Ukrainian governments. China’s cold attitude toward Ukraine began as far back as the Yanukovych era. Therefore, blaming the current Ukrainian government for not doing enough to bring China to our side would be an exaggeration.

So on one hand, the role of the Global South itself; on the other, the colossal influence Russia still has over these countries. We have lost a great deal. It was a mistake to throw absolutely all diplomatic resources at the EU and NATO and forget that the UN exists — despite my personal lack of respect for this organization, even though I served there twice and have every moral right to speak this way about it. It is useless, and will never become useful. Nevertheless, it exists, and two-thirds, if not more, of the Global South countries sit there — countries to which Ukraine is irrelevant. Someone received a “suitcase” of money from Russia, someone had their debts written off, and someone simply has former students who studied at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Although thousands studied in Ukraine too. And who has ever gathered them even once? And these are presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers of African, Caribbean, and other countries. And Sergey Lavrov, by the way, gathered all graduates every year. I think he still does. That is how they keep these people as their de facto agents. And this is one of the reasons why we cannot break the position of very many of these countries. When the so-called Crimea Resolution was first adopted at the UN in 2016, of the 22 Arab countries that are members of the Arab League, 20 voted “in favor” and two abstained. And last year, not a single Arab country voted for such a resolution.

Regarding a new security architecture in Europe, Boris Johnson once — while still Prime Minister of the United Kingdom — said that a new organization needed to be created. He envisioned it as a Scandinavian–Black Sea belt. In his view, it could include Scandinavian countries, some of them, the United Kingdom, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Turkey… Then this idea naturally transformed into a coalition of the willing. And this was already an idea of Macron and the previous German chancellor. And where is that coalition? We still need to convince these key countries and work on getting them to move from words to deeds. Because how many more years can one travel to Brussels for discussions? Or spend every weekend in Paris, Berlin, or London? Discussing — and doing nothing. It is hard for us to blame our closest partners for giving us too few weapons or too little money, because they genuinely support us, especially in the absence of such support from the United States. But one cannot just keep talking and holding meetings.

We had great hopes that the United States would pull us through. And I too mistakenly believed that Trump would change his mind, as he did during his first presidency. Back then, Trump listened to the advisors he had. Today, in my opinion, he listens to no one. And all these replacements of ministers, Cabinet members, only result in even worse ones arriving.

That is why our efforts must be concentrated on a coalition of the willing (unwilling or eager — call it what you will), but these are the countries that can pull us through.

Vitaliy Savych: “We can train NATO structures”

Vitaliy Savych
Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Hero of Ukraine

The training level and coordination of combat operations in Ukraine have reached such a level that we can train NATO structures. My colleagues, brothers-in-arms, travel abroad for training, yet they try to extract more from us than we receive from them. And in the future, I believe we can show them top-level performance. If only they take us into their Alliance. Regarding the technical aspect: I represent army aviation — we are helicopter pilots, and our fleet is worn out. Everything that army aviation does — providing fire support at the front lines, shooting down Shaheds — yes, we shoot down a large percentage, but technically we are quite weak. We need new helicopters, a new class. We need to improve our industrial capabilities. There must be diplomatic agreements for an aviation coalition for F-16s, and for army aviation as well.

Boosting morale in the army is also important. The key is a strong rear: popularizing the military profession, military-patriotic education in schools from the earliest levels, encouraging enrollment in higher education institutions for pilot training (this is the Kharkiv University of Air Forces, which trains not only pilots but also aviation specialists, engineers, air defense specialists). Regarding the patriotic education of youth, we are working on this ourselves. Personally, I engage in this in my brigade. I visit schools, we conduct advocacy and outreach. Another top priority is eliminating bureaucracy in the army. There is a significant amount of bureaucracy, and it demoralizes people. Procurement — getting anything approved, directed anywhere. We still operate under laws modeled on the Soviet era, simply translated into Ukrainian. All documents governing flight operations date from the 1970s–80s, merely adapted into the Ukrainian language…

Olha Salo: “Society’s demand is a question of identity”

Olha Salo
Deputy Director General of the National Museum of the Revolution of Dignity (2018–2026), head of cultural initiatives at the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation

Regarding the importance of culture, everyone verbally acknowledges its weight. If you ask anyone whether culture matters, they will say: “Yes.” And I would have to say the same. It is our firmware that forms the core onto which all our other qualities are then threaded: defense capability, economic potential. All of this is about culture. There is no point in even debating this. But when we move to the practical level, on an individual level, everyone’s self-development, their identification, is conscious and important. Yet at the decision-making level (local authorities, the government), culture remains secondary, if not tertiary. And this is a very painful topic for everyone working in the cultural sphere.

You would agree that entering the official state cultural sector today is not a story of personal success. Very rarely is it perceived that way. Because in reality, these people also work in terrible bureaucratic conditions with pay below the level of dignity. It all adds up. And what do we see? We see people for whom this work is their calling. And they actually ensure our mobilization potential. I was impressed by a recent trip to museums in central and western Ukraine and meetings with museum leadership. These are people who conduct activities every day. Their target audience is youth — school and university students. The next target audience is our military. Museums are becoming a kind of hub for cultural education, patriotic upbringing. And they will continue doing all of this. But the attitude toward these people, even from those who visit them, leaves much to be desired. This is not a sphere that commands authority in society, at the state level. The state does not recognize cultural institutions as authoritative platforms.

On one hand, awareness of the value of culture is constantly growing. We see success stories, excellent exhibition cases, especially in Kyiv — at the Ukrainian House, at the Mystetskyi Arsenal. We see an enormous demand for revived Ukrainian art that was previously suppressed. An enormous demand for recovered pages of history. But let us look at those people who form the basis of responses to these demands. The authority of a person working in the cultural sphere in our country is, unfortunately, not high. And consequently, perhaps, the authority of what they say is not that high either? All these things are connected. On the other hand, we see published results of a study commissioned by the Ministry of Culture. The question concerned Ukrainian content, the demand for Ukrainian content. And for respondents, the most interesting, the most important thing was the search for their own identity. They recognize successful projects — exhibitions, books, projects related to culture and art. And they are successful precisely because they inevitably reveal something about identity. Society’s demand is precisely for this.

When we deoccupy our territories, what will we bring there? Yes, we will need to restore administration, security elements, but we will also need to bring ourselves there, our identity, our culture. And this again sounds abstract. What do we need to bring? We need to bring not just Ukrainian culture — we need to bring local culture there. The people who shaped the face, the identity of these regions, these cities, this history, who are the bearers of this memory. But we cannot force people to return. We can try to bring back this local, regional memory. And this is an enormous task of preserving this memory, this identity.

One more point, when we talk about the regional dimension of patriotism and Ukrainian identity. We all live in our communities, and it is precisely these communities that form the values that then motivate people to take up arms and defend their values and their territory. In reality, at the community level, the awareness that budgets must allocate funds for culture is very low. And here lies the dissonance. On one hand, we understand that this is a war for our identity, not for territory. On the other — the practical aspect: are we ready to support the culture that will shape our defense capability? And here I am talking about specific problems: cultural institutions under community jurisdiction feel that the community is not interested in them.

I really liked the point made by our distinguished diplomats about the need for an overall strategy — cultural, ideological, a strategy for the war, a vision of our victory, a vision of what we will do, what Ukraine’s territory should ultimately be, what we will do with the deoccupied territories, and so on. I do not know whether the topic of supporting Ukrainians in our occupied territories, the issue of protecting cultural heritage, is in any way present in peace negotiations. On the other hand, I have heard that the issue of the Russian church is being raised by Russia, as well as the issue of the Russian language, its protection… And these are fundamental aspects. Again, we always say in words that culture, identity — these are the foundations. But are they present in our concrete actions?

Prepared by Halyna Huzyo. Source: zbruc.eu