Can Russia Be Expelled from the UN? — Essay by Ivan Tsymbal

To understand this issue, we must examine the norms of the UN Charter, historical precedents, and the current balance of power in the international arena — including the position of the Global South.

Article 6 of the UN Charter: Theory and Practical Impossibility

At first glance, the UN Charter contains a clear mechanism for expelling a state from the Organization. Under Article 6, a member that has persistently violated the principles of the Charter may be expelled by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

In practice, however, this is nearly impossible. The main legal obstacle is that a Security Council recommendation constitutes a non-procedural decision. Under Article 27 of the Charter, such decisions require the concurrence of all five permanent members — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. It is self-evident that Russia will always veto any recommendation for its own expulsion, and China would in all likelihood support it.

A more radical approach would be to amend the UN Charter itself — removing references to Russia or the USSR from Article 23, which defines the composition of the Security Council. However, Article 108 of the Charter stipulates that amendments enter into force only after approval by two-thirds of the General Assembly’s members and ratification by two-thirds of all member states, necessarily including all permanent members of the Security Council. The veto power thus reliably blocks any direct expulsion of Russia.

The Question of Continuity: Did Russia Lawfully Inherit the USSR’s Seat?

The impossibility of direct expulsion has led diplomats and international law scholars to revisit the events of 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR. International law distinguishes between two distinct concepts: state succession and state continuity. State succession refers to the transfer of rights and obligations to new states that emerge following the dissolution of a predecessor state. Such new states must submit fresh applications for UN membership under Article 4 of the Charter — as happened in 1993 following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, when the Czech Republic and Slovakia each applied separately. State continuity, by contrast, refers to a state’s preservation of its international legal personality, allowing it to remain a member of organizations automatically.

In December 1991, the transfer of the USSR’s seat to Russia took place on the basis of continuity, without a formal accession procedure. On December 24, 1991, the USSR’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Yuli Vorontsov, delivered a letter from President Boris Yeltsin to the Secretary-General, stating that the USSR’s membership was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of CIS member states, in accordance with the Alma-Ata Declaration. By January 31, 1992, Boris Yeltsin had already taken his seat at a Security Council session. This transition also rested on the fact that Russia encompassed the majority of the former Union’s territory and population.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that Russia’s assumption of the USSR’s seat was a political rather than a legal decision. Since Russia has violated the Charter’s norms and the borders of its neighbors, it has forfeited its claim to continuity. By this logic, given that Belarus became a co-participant in the invasion, Ukraine remains the only founding UN member among the former Soviet republics that continues to uphold the Charter — and therefore holds stronger claims to the USSR’s seat.

Despite the coherence of this argument, it faces the concept of acquiescence. For over 30 years, the General Assembly, the Security Council, and all member states have interacted with Russia as a legitimate permanent member. The International Court of Justice, in its order of March 16, 2022, explicitly noted that the Russian Federation is the state continuing the legal personality of the USSR. Under customary international law, such prolonged and consistent practice removes any legal ambiguity regarding Russia’s status.

The Credentials Procedure as an Alternative Instrument

Given the inapplicability of Article 6, an alternative mechanism is the credentials procedure. UN history offers two precedents in which political questions were resolved through this procedural instrument. In 1971, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, recognizing the government in Beijing as the sole lawful representative of China in the UN and removing Taiwan’s representatives; in 1974, the General Assembly rejected the credentials of South Africa’s delegation in response to the policy of apartheid.

The procedure works as follows: under Rules 27–29 of the General Assembly, delegates’ credentials are examined by the Credentials Committee. In the Security Council, Rule 17 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure provides that a representative whose credentials are challenged continues to occupy their seat until the Council resolves the matter. The key detail is that a vote on credentials is a procedural question (under Article 27(2) of the Charter), requiring only 9 votes — meaning the veto does not apply.

In theory, Ukraine could issue credentials to its own diplomat to occupy the USSR’s seat, and other Security Council members could support this through a procedural vote, bypassing Russia’s veto. Politically, however, this scenario currently appears unrealistic. Most states are reluctant to set such a precedent, fearing it could trigger the collapse of the entire UN system.

Article 27(3): Mandatory Abstention of a Party to a Dispute

At present, the most realistic legal mechanism for limiting Russia’s influence remains the application of Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. This provision requires a party to a dispute to abstain from voting on decisions concerning the peaceful settlement of that dispute (Chapter VI). This rule applies even to permanent members of the Security Council.

In practice, states in violation of this norm often circumvent it by claiming that what is under consideration is not a specific “dispute” between countries but a broader “situation” affecting general peace — thereby allowing them to vote. For example, the Soviet Union vetoed an investigation into the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983, and Russia vetoed resolutions concerning its war against Georgia (2009) and the annexation of Crimea (2014).

Yet Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is such an evident “dispute” that ignoring Article 27(3) is becoming increasingly difficult to justify. Security Council Resolution 2774 (2025), which called for a lasting peace between Ukraine and Russia, was considered within the logic of Chapter VI. The fact that Russia participated in the vote on that resolution has once again raised the question of mandatory enforcement of compulsory abstention. Systematic application of this article could unblock the Security Council’s work on matters of peaceful settlement.

The General Assembly and the “Uniting for Peace” Mechanism

Amid the Security Council’s paralysis, the center of political decision-making has shifted to the General Assembly. This has been made possible by the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism (Resolution 377 A, 1950), which allows the Assembly to consider threats to peace and make recommendations for collective action when the Security Council is unable to act due to a veto.

In early 2026, on the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty, which received 107 votes in favor, 12 against, and 51 abstentions. While these resolutions carry no binding legal force, they provide a basis for imposing sanctions and delivering military assistance to Ukraine. As we previously reported, this issue became central to participants in the #UnRussiaUN student essay competition.

The Position of the Global South: The Key Obstacle

The main obstacle to more assertive diplomatic action against Russia remains the position of the Global South (particularly the G77 group). Their caution is explained by several factors.

First, there is the economic dependence of African and Middle Eastern countries, which fear disruptions to Russian supplies of food, energy, and fertilizers. Second, in Latin America and Africa, Russia has successfully cultivated an ideological narrative presenting itself as an anti-colonial leader standing against Western dominance. Third, authoritarian regimes across Asia and the Middle East support Russia out of fear that the instruments of UN exclusion could eventually be turned against them.

Despite Ukraine’s readiness to accept extraordinarily difficult compromises in order to end the fighting, the Kremlin’s ambition to reduce Ukraine to a satellite state makes a swift diplomatic resolution impossible. At the same time, the new US administration under Donald Trump is intensifying pressure for negotiations to halt the bloodshed, while the European Union maintains that any peace must be grounded in international law and the UN Charter. Russia, meanwhile, continues to use UN platforms to shift the focus toward other regional conflicts and to propagate its own narratives.

Conclusion

In summary, the answer to the question “Can Russia be expelled from the UN?” is, at the current stage of international relations, largely negative. From a legal standpoint, the expulsion procedure under Article 6 of the Charter is blocked by the veto, while attempts to challenge Russia’s status as the successor state of the USSR face thirty years of acquiescence by the international community. The use of a credentials challenge is theoretically possible but politically unrealistic, given the concerns of Global South countries about the destabilization of the current architecture of international relations.

Yet the impossibility of expulsion does not mean an absence of tools for influence. Ukraine’s key diplomatic objectives must include demanding compliance with Article 27(3) of the UN Charter regarding mandatory abstention by a party to a dispute, as well as maximizing the potential of the General Assembly through the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism. This will not expel the aggressor from the UN immediately, but it will help limit its influence going forward. Similar conclusions are reached in the essay by Kyrylo Kharchenko.

Ivan Vitaliyovych Tsymbal
Vasyl’ Stus Donetsk National University
Faculty of History and International Relations