“Legal Nullity and Geopolitical Destruction”: Why Russia’s Expulsion from the UN Is a Necessary Investment in Future Security

Legal Nullity: How Russia Seized the USSR’s Seat at the UN

In December 1991, the world witnessed unprecedented legal nihilism: the Russian Federation claimed the permanent Security Council seat not through the legitimate admission procedure under Article 4 of the Charter — as other successor states had done following the dissolution of federations — but on the basis of a simple letter and the tacit consent of major powers. This created a dangerous legal vacuum in which a state fundamentally different from the USSR in its essence, ideology, and internal structure claimed the status of “continuator state” without a proper vote by the General Assembly. The choice made by world leaders at the time was driven not by respect for the letter of the law, but by cynical Realpolitik calculation — fear of losing control over a nuclear arsenal. International law was sacrificed on the altar of illusory stability, allowing the current regime to enjoy immunity obtained in circumvention of the Charter for decades. Today we are dealing with a legal “squatter” that systematically destroys the principles of the UN while using its instruments to legitimize its own crimes. Furthermore, treating the Russian Federation as a unified subject ignores its true nature as a “prison of peoples,” where imperial centralization suppresses the right to self-determination of dozens of ethnic groups. The delegitimization of Russia’s presence in the UN is therefore not merely a matter of political will — it is a necessary act of legal sanitation that will allow the world to finally emerge from the shadow of the Soviet past and open the path toward a genuine transformation of this territorial entity.

Why the West Fears Redrawing the Map

The problem of expelling the Russian Federation from the UN lies not so much in the legal dimension as in the paralyzing conservatism of global decision-making centers. Despite the obvious destructiveness of Moscow’s actions, Washington, Brussels, and Beijing continue inertially to sustain the viability of “old Russia,” seeing in its integrity the lesser evil compared to a radical change in world order. For the collective West, the current Russian Federation — even in the role of aggressor — remains a comprehensible and predictable actor within its vertical of power, while the emergence of new state formations from its ruins is perceived as a geopolitical “leap into the unknown.” World leaders fear not so much the empire’s collapse as the loss of the single communication window on the nuclear arsenal, chaos in energy markets, and the need to build relationships with a dozen new players. This is why Russia’s expulsion from the UN is viewed by many not as an act of justice, but as a dangerous precedent that could undermine the entire postwar system of checks and balances. Yet this fear is a strategic trap: by attempting to preserve a unified Russia as a “convenient partner” or “buffer zone,” the West is fueling the source of global instability with its own hands. It is necessary to demonstrate to the international community that maintaining the imperial monolith costs more than transitioning to a new configuration of forces. Instead of the illusory stability supposedly provided by the Kremlin, the world should see the prospect of risk diversification through the creation of a network of demilitarized, treaty-capable entities — a notional “Russian Switzerland.” Recognizing the illegitimacy of the current Russian Federation and the subjectivity of new liberation movements such as the RVC should be presented not as the destruction of order, but as its modernization. Only by overcoming this fear of redrawing the world map can the transition be made from a policy of “appeasing the monster” to genuine security — where instead of one nuclear blackmailer, regional partners emerge whose path to UN recognition runs through a complete renunciation of aggression and imperial ambitions.

Decentralization as a Security Strategy

The West’s recognition that inertial support for “integrity at any cost” is a strategic dead end requires a transition to a new model of global risk management. If the current UN architecture is held together by fear of “many-headed chaos,” then the task of contemporary legal and political thought is to prove the opposite: a monolithic Russia is not a guarantor of stability but a source of inevitable catastrophe. The internal construction of this empire historically demands external expansion to maintain domestic legitimacy, which makes any compromise with the center merely a temporary respite before a new cycle of aggression. The international community must therefore be offered a concept of a decentralized space not as a threat, but as a form of diversifying security risks. Instead of a single nuclear monster impossible to stop without risking global annihilation, the world will gain a number of small, competitive entities. Such formations will be too weak to revive the imperial project, yet critically interested in international recognition for their own survival. Instead of fruitless attempts to negotiate with an intractable Kremlin, the West will have the opportunity to build relationships with new regional players — from the Baltics to the Pacific Ocean. These entities will compete for Western investment, technology, and legitimacy, offering in return transparent resource control and full demilitarization under UN oversight. This is the transition from an outdated “stability through fear” to a modern “stability through balance of small powers.” In this context, delegitimizing Russia in the United Nations is not merely an act of retribution, but a necessary condition for launching a managed process of “civilized divorce.” By acting as arbiter in the dismantling of this “prison of peoples,” the international community will ensure the transformation of an unpredictable threat into a predictable process of regional development, where the loyalty of new states to international law will be the only path to their economic and political prosperity.

Ukraine as Architect of a New Security System

The removal of the Russian Federation from the United Nations and the subsequent deconstruction of its imperial structure is not merely a question of restoring legal justice — it is a strategic opportunity for Ukraine to become a key architect of future European security. The transition from a monolithic aggressive state to a branching network of demilitarized entities — a notional “Russian Switzerland” — creates a unique window of opportunity in which Ukraine acts not simply as a victim of aggression, but as a moderator of transformational processes. A special role in this vision is played by support for alternative forces, in particular the Russian Volunteer Corps (RVC). Integrated into the structure of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, these forces effectively serve as conductors of our security interests within the Russian space itself. Relying on controllable and predictable liberation movements allows us to offer the West not chaotic disintegration, but a managed transfer of statehood. Ukraine gains from this scenario on three levels. First, we definitively eliminate the strategic threat from the east, replacing a nuclear aggressor-neighbor with a number of small states whose path to legitimacy in the UN will pass through Kyiv. Second, we acquire the status of the leading expert and guarantor of stability in the region, fundamentally strengthening our position as a future member of NATO and the EU. Third, through influence over new political elites on the territories of the former Russian Federation, we secure a long-term economic and security protectorate, converting military power into political leadership on the continent. Russia’s expulsion from the UN is thus the first step toward a world in which Ukraine is no longer a “sanitary cordon,” but becomes a center of power that dictates the rules of a new, just, and diversified international security system.

References

1. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: zakon.rada.gov.ua (accessed: April 10, 2026).
2. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23, 1978. United Nations. URL: treaties.un.org (accessed: April 10, 2026).
3. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the Illegitimacy of the Russian Federation’s Presence in the UN Security Council and the United Nations as a Whole, December 26, 2022. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. URL: mfa.gov.ua (accessed: April 10, 2026).
4. Kyslytsya S. O. Statements of the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN on UN Security Council Reform and Russia’s Status. Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN. URL: ukraineun.org (accessed: April 10, 2026).
5. Grant T. D. Admission to UN Membership: Legal Aspects and Political Realities. International Law Review. 2023. No. 4. Pp. 112–125.
6. Model of RF Disintegration: Political and Legal Scenarios for the Post-Colonial Space. Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security. URL: spravdi.gov.ua (accessed: April 10, 2026).
7. Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives / transl. O. Feshovets. Lviv: Litopys, 2022. 236 p.
8. Charter of the Russian Volunteer Corps and Declaration of Political Goals. Official RVC Resources. URL: rusvolcorps.com (accessed: April 10, 2026).

As we reported earlier, the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation announced the winners of the first nationwide student essay contest under the #UnRussiaUN initiative. Among other finalists’ works is the essay “How to Strip Russia of Its Veto in the UN Security Council on Ukraine.”