Can Russia Be Expelled from the UN? — Essay by Artem Tkachenko

The UN Charter identifies the maintenance of international peace and security as one of the Organization’s primary purposes. Article 1 speaks of preventing threats to peace, suppressing acts of aggression, and resolving disputes in accordance with international law. Article 2 enshrines the sovereign equality of states, the obligation to settle disputes peacefully, and the prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state [1, Art. 1, 2]. These are precisely the principles that Russia has systematically violated against Ukraine.

The UN was not founded as an alliance of states sharing identical political views. Its purpose also includes providing a platform for contact even between adversarial states. Through the UN, states record their positions and discuss wars, humanitarian crises, nuclear risks, sanctions, and security matters. Russia’s presence in the UN therefore does not imply endorsement of its actions. The problem lies elsewhere: Russia exploits its seat not merely to participate in dialogue, but to block decisions concerning its own aggression. The most dangerous aspect is not Russia’s membership in the UN per se, but the situation in which an aggressor acts as arbiter in the case of its own aggression.

Two Distinct Questions: Expulsion and Deprivation of Status

It is important to distinguish between two questions: the expulsion of Russia from the UN as a member state, and the removal of its privileged status as a permanent member of the Security Council. The first is explicitly provided for in Article 6 of the Charter. The second is more complex, as it is bound up with the history of the USSR’s seat on the Security Council, the text of Article 23 of the Charter, and the overall architecture of the Organization [1, Art. 6, 23].

The UN Charter provides a mechanism for expelling a member state. Under Article 6, a UN member that has persistently violated the principles of the Charter may be expelled by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Article 5 also provides for the suspension of the rights and privileges of a member state against which the Security Council has taken preventive or enforcement action [1, Art. 5, 6]. In substance, these provisions may apply to Russia, since its aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated violation but a sustained state policy.

Here, however, a legal trap emerges. Both expulsion and suspension of rights require a recommendation from the Security Council — and Russia is a permanent member of that body. Article 27 of the Charter effectively entrenches the special role of permanent members in non-procedural decisions, which in practice has become a right of veto [1, Art. 27]. Russia can therefore block any decision that concerns its own accountability. This became apparent at the very outset of the full-scale invasion, when Russia vetoed a Security Council draft resolution calling for a halt to its attack on Ukraine. The problem is not technical but systemic: the Charter provides for the punishment of a violating state, but is nearly inoperative when the violator is itself a permanent member of the Security Council.

The idea of amending the Charter itself offers no quick solution. Under Article 108, amendments enter into force only after adoption by two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratification by two thirds of UN members, including all permanent members of the Security Council [1, Art. 108]. In other words, any reform that might limit the Russian veto or alter Russia’s status would, in practice, require Russia’s own consent.

The Status of Successor State to the USSR

A separate argument concerns Russia’s status as the continuator state of the USSR. Article 23 of the Charter names the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — not the Russian Federation — among the permanent members of the Security Council [1, Art. 23]. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia effectively assumed its seat in the UN without undergoing a separate admission procedure as a new member state. The formal basis for this was a letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the UN Secretary-General in December 1991, in which Russia declared its continuation of the USSR’s membership. Russia was thus accepted not merely as one of the successor states of the USSR, but as its continuator state.

This distinction matters. A successor state may inherit certain rights and obligations of a predecessor, but this does not always entail the automatic retention of all its international statuses. A continuator state, by contrast, claims continuity of the predecessor’s international legal personality. In the broader context, this issue is connected to the rules of state succession, including the approaches reflected in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978, although the question of a seat on the UN Security Council cannot be reduced to treaty succession alone [2].

In the early 1990s, this approach may have appeared pragmatic: it was necessary to avoid chaos, maintain control over the USSR’s nuclear legacy, and ensure continuity of Security Council operations. After 2014, and especially after 24 February 2022, this decision has taken on a different significance. Russia exploits the USSR’s seat not to maintain peace, but to shield its own aggressive policy. At the same time, this argument does not constitute a ready-made procedure for immediate expulsion, as Russia’s participation in the UN has in practice been recognized by the majority of states for over thirty years. Nevertheless, the questionable nature of Russia’s automatic recognition as the sole continuator of the USSR may serve as an important instrument of delegitimization.

A Realistic Strategy and the Role of the General Assembly

Ukraine’s realistic strategy should consist not of waiting for a single swift decision, but of combining several lines of action. First, it is necessary to continuously remind the international community that Russia’s conduct is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Second, the legitimacy of Russia’s privileged status as the purported sole continuator of the USSR should be called into question. Third, efforts must be made to limit Russia’s participation in those bodies of the UN system where this is feasible. One example of such an approach was the suspension of Russia’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council in 2022 [5].

Since 2022, it is the General Assembly that has become the principal forum where a majority of states has been able to express a position on Russian aggression, despite Security Council paralysis. Its resolutions do not replace the binding decisions of the Security Council, but carry significant political weight: they demonstrate that the Russian position is not universally accepted, and that the right of veto cannot fully conceal the international isolation of the aggressor [3; 4].

Precedents: Resolution 2758 and the Case of South Africa

The history of the UN offers non-standard decisions on the representation of states. The most important example is General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. Prior to its adoption, China’s seat in the UN — including the permanent seat on the Security Council — was held by representatives of the Republic of China, i.e., the government that after the civil war effectively controlled Taiwan. Resolution 2758 restored the rights of the People’s Republic of China in the UN, recognized its representatives as the only lawful representatives of China, and decided to remove the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the seat they occupied in the UN and its related organizations [6]. This example is significant not as a classic expulsion of “Taiwan” from the UN, but as a change in who is recognized as the legitimate representative of a state within the Organization. For Ukrainian argumentation, this is relevant: in the case of Russia, the question can likewise be raised not merely about the formal expulsion of a member state, but about the legitimacy of its representation and its privileged seat, which it assumed as the purported sole continuator of the USSR.

A similar logic, though in a different context, can be seen in the case of South Africa, whose delegation was effectively excluded from participation in the work of the General Assembly due to its apartheid policy. In the same context, it is worth mentioning the General Assembly’s Credentials Committee: while it cannot expel a state from the UN, questions of delegations’ credentials can be used to raise the issue of the legitimacy of representation [7; 8].

Consequences and Conclusions

The complete removal of Russia from the UN has its weaknesses and consequences. Such a step would likely deepen divisions among states, and Russia’s full exclusion from a universal forum could complicate communication on issues where contact remains necessary: nuclear security, humanitarian matters, exchanges, and risk management. Ukraine’s position must therefore be not only morally clear, but also legally precise. The goal is not to destroy the UN, but to protect the Organization from abuse by an aggressor.

In sum, expelling Russia from the UN through a single legal step is nearly impossible. Such a move requires a Security Council recommendation, which Russia as a permanent member will block. Amending the Charter is likewise practically unfeasible without the participation of the permanent members themselves, Russia included. But this does not mean the question should be removed from the agenda. The debate over Russia’s place in the UN forces the international community to confront the abnormality of a situation in which an aggressor state enjoys the privileges of a system designed to deter aggression.

For Ukraine, this is not merely a symbolic struggle. It is a means of defending the very idea of international law: an aggressor cannot simultaneously undermine the system of collective security and exploit its most powerful instruments to ensure its own impunity. The question of Russia’s place in the UN should therefore not be reduced to an emotional appeal. It must be Ukraine’s long-term legal and diplomatic work: not to allow the aggressor to use the silence of the system as proof of its own legitimacy.

Artem Dmytrovych Tkachenko,
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv,
Educational and Scientific Institute of International Relations

References

1. Charter of the United Nations (as amended). Charter of the International Court of Justice: international document of 26.06.1945. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_010#Text (accessed: 25.04.2026).
2. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties: done at Vienna on 23 August 1978. United Nations Treaty Series. Vol. 1946. P. 3. URL: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf (accessed: 25.04.2026).
3. Aggression against Ukraine: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 2 March 2022: A/RES/ES-11/1. United Nations Digital Library. New York: United Nations, 2022. 4 p. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3965290 (accessed: 30.04.2026).
4. Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 12 October 2022: A/RES/ES-11/4. United Nations Digital Library. New York: United Nations, 2022. 3 p. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3990673 (accessed: 30.04.2026).
5. Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 7 April 2022: A/RES/ES-11/3. United Nations Digital Library. New York: United Nations, 2022. 2 p. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3967950 (accessed: 30.04.2026).
6. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 25 October 1971: A/RES/2758(XXVI). United Nations Digital Library. URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054 (accessed: 01.05.2026).
7. Cohen A., Inozemtsev V. How to expel Russia from the UN. Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program. URL: https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/how-to-expel-russia-from-the-un/ (accessed: 01.05.2026).
8. Grant T. D. Expelling Russia from the UN Security Council: A How-to Guide. Center for European Policy Analysis. 2022. September 26. URL: https://cepa.org/article/expelling-russia-from-the-un-security-council-a-how-to-guide/ (accessed: 01.05.2026).