Can Russia Be Expelled from the UN? — An Essay by Yevhen Kostohryzov

Author: Yevhen Kostohryzov, Faculty of Social Sciences and Social Technologies, Department of International Relations, NaUKMA.

The Question of Russia’s Legitimate UN Membership

Since the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian Federation has used its veto in the UN Security Council 39 times, paralyzing the body on such issues as the intervention in Cyprus in 2004, actions regarding Myanmar in 2007, the imposition of sanctions and an arms embargo against Syria in 2011–2012, as well as all resolutions touching on Russia’s interests in the war against Ukraine (S/2022/155, S/2022/720, etc.). More exotic uses of the veto — such as blocking a resolution on prohibiting the placement of weapons in outer space — have also occurred.

These glaring facts reflect Russia’s total instrumentalization of its inherited seat as a permanent Security Council member. Russia clearly views the UN Security Council (and, more broadly, the UN as a whole) as an instrument-organization rather than a platform-organization, let alone an actor-organization. Depriving Russia of this instrument is therefore an important component of Ukraine’s national interest.

The Russian Federation’s membership in the UN and, specifically, in the Security Council rests on three core documents: the decision of the CIS summit in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991; the letter from RSFSR President Yeltsin to UN Secretary-General de Cuéllar on December 24, 1991; and the note from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Russia’s continuation of the USSR’s international obligations, dated January 13, 1992. These arguments are, naturally, advanced by Russia and its allies. However, a range of legal and political arguments can challenge the legitimacy of Russia’s UN membership.

First, the only procedure for joining the UN is established by Article 4(2) of the UN Charter, which requires a state to be admitted by a vote of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. None of the three documents cited by Russia satisfies the definition of Article 4(2). Second, the legality of Yeltsin’s letter to de Cuéllar on December 24, 1991 is questionable, since the Russian Federation was officially established only the following day — December 25. Even the letter itself mentions the RF alongside the RSFSR. This creates an additional legal problem: the letter equates the RF with the RSFSR rather than with the USSR — and the legal basis for equating the RSFSR with the USSR is the aforementioned CIS summit decision, which in no way satisfies Article 4(2). Third, the assumption of international obligations under the note is a unilateral act and cannot be universally binding if it contradicts the founding documents of international organizations, which are by their nature multilateral.

Beyond the problems that arose at the outset of Russia’s path into the UN, there are further grounds that limit or preclude Russia’s membership. For instance, Article 6 of the UN Charter provides for the expulsion of a member state that systematically violates the principles of the Charter; while Article 27(3) states that a state “party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” on decisions in the Security Council. Since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been officially established and condemned by the UN General Assembly in Resolution ES-11/1 “Aggression against Ukraine” of March 2, 2022, it is possible to demand the application of Article 27(3) in Security Council votes concerning the Russo-Ukrainian war. Other GA resolutions that directly or indirectly condemn Russia’s actions could serve as grounds for invoking Article 6. The problem, however, is that applying Article 6 and initiating the expulsion of a member state requires the consent of all permanent members of the Security Council — of which Russia is de facto one. Mechanisms for resolving this problem are proposed in the following section.

The logical conclusion is that Russia has no solid legal grounds for UN membership. Its presence in the Organization and on the Security Council is the result of the political consensus reached during the dissolution of the USSR and the reluctance of major powers (such as the United States) to significantly alter the status quo or make the transition from the USSR to the RF “risky.” The solutions to the problem that has arisen must therefore lie not only in the legal sphere, but also in the political one.

Five Options for Expelling or Restricting Russia’s Rights

Five options can be identified for expelling, partially expelling, or restricting Russia’s rights within the Organization: 1) administrative expulsion by the Secretariat on grounds of illegitimate membership; 2) recognition of an alternative Russian government as the legitimate government of Russia (the “Taiwan scenario”); 3) enforcement by the UN Security Council Presidency of Article 27(3) of the Charter, restricting Russia’s right to vote on relevant resolutions; 4) Ukraine filing a claim to occupy the USSR’s seat in the UN pursuant to Rule 17 of the Security Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure; 5) non-admission of Russia to the Organization after initiating a formal accession procedure.

The first option appears simplest at first glance, but is the least likely. No UN Secretary-General would want to assume responsibility for what could be seen, from some perspectives, as an arbitrary decision, and the political risks would motivate influential member states to pressure the Secretariat against expelling Russia. China, for instance, could in such a scenario threaten the UN with the suspension of its contributions to the Organization’s budget — contributions that account for 20% of total funding. Moreover, the Secretariat’s recognition of Russia as an illegitimate member would undermine decisions in which Russia participated within the UN framework — nearly all decisions over the past 35 years. This option is therefore, unfortunately, almost inconceivable, even if it has legal foundations.

The second option has a precedent in UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of October 25, 1971, on the “restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China” in the UN. The method by which that decision was made did not require a recommendation from the Security Council, meaning that a de facto change of representation on the Security Council without the Council’s own consent is a real possibility. However, another problem arises here: under the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), a state must have a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. These criteria were met by the PRC in 1971, but would not be met by a hypothetical “alternative Russia.” Furthermore, in the case of replacing the ROC with the PRC, there was political consensus between the USSR and the United States, so neither side contested the decision. Today, it is doubtful that even the United States under its current administration would consent to Russia’s hypothetical expulsion by this method. The second option is therefore also unlikely.

The third option does not involve expelling Russia from the UN or even stripping it of its permanent Security Council seat, but could nonetheless substantially advance Ukraine’s national interest. Ukraine could submit a request to the UN Security Council Presidency regarding Russia’s failure to comply with Article 27(3) of the UN Charter — the obligation to abstain from voting on matters concerning the interests of a party to a dispute — with a subsequent request to invalidate Russia’s votes on relevant issues. This approach is admittedly risky, since not every member state represented on the Security Council politically supports Ukraine, let alone would be willing to undertake a truly unprecedented change in the Council’s functioning on Ukraine’s behalf. Yet such states exist: the Baltic states, for example. Latvia is currently one of the non-permanent Security Council members and is due to chair the Security Council Presidency in November 2026. Engaging Latvia in cooperation on the above-described measures may prove more effective than options 1 and 2 — since this approach does not involve directly expelling Russia, but only restricts part of its prerogatives.

The fourth option involves challenging Russia’s successor status on the Security Council. Ukraine could assert the credentials of its representatives to occupy the Soviet Union’s seat on the Security Council on the grounds of Russia’s violations of the UN Charter’s principles (invoking the same GA Resolution ES-11/1). Subsequently, pursuant to Rule 17 of the Security Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure, a committee would rule on the credentials of the USSR delegation’s representatives (since Article 23 of the Charter provides for the membership of the USSR itself). The question of credentials is formally a procedural matter, meaning that 9 out of 15 votes would suffice to adopt a decision in Ukraine’s favor — and Russia cannot apply its veto on procedural matters. This option could work, but requires Ukraine to take extraordinary steps (asserting claims to the USSR’s rights) and a favorable configuration of states on the Security Council (with 9 out of 15 voting in Ukraine’s favor).

The fifth option is quite creative: rather than expelling Russia, it aims to achieve its non-admission. What does this mean? Since Russia never underwent the accession procedure under Article 4 of the Charter, it is possible to attempt to initiate that procedure now — not with the aim of admitting Russia, but on the contrary, to “cement” its non-admission to the Organization. However, initiating an accession procedure requires an application from Russia itself and a recommendation from the Security Council. This cannot be achieved… unless the preceding options are applied first.

A Combined Approach and Conclusions

None of the options described above guarantees Russia’s expulsion from the Security Council or the UN as a whole, but a combination of options 3, 4, and 5 could work. Ukraine could attempt to restrict Russia’s right to vote in the Security Council (option 3), then attempt to occupy Russia’s seat using the Security Council’s Rules of Procedure (option 4). If Ukraine were to occupy Russia’s seat even for a limited period, Russia would be forced to fight for its place and might begin seeking ways to legitimize its UN participation by undergoing the formal accession procedure under Article 4 of the Charter. Alternatively, Ukraine could continue to “squeeze” Russia out of other UN bodies using its newly acquired standing. In any case, if Russia were compelled to undergo the Article 4 procedure, Ukraine — either by exercising the rights of a permanent Security Council member, or (if such rights are lost or not acquired) by mobilizing states in the General Assembly — could block Russia’s legally proper admission to the United Nations. The realization of the scenario described here could, at minimum, restrict Russia’s veto on Ukraine-related matters in the Security Council, and at most, lead to Russia losing its membership in the Organization altogether.

The principal conclusion of this brief study is that a combination of political factors is required for the partial or complete expulsion of Russia from the UN. The legal foundation for such actions exists, as do precedents for changes in state representation without strict adherence to legal formalities. Ukraine must therefore focus on fostering the necessary international environment in the Security Council and the General Assembly, and should ideally secure the support — or at least the neutrality — of major UN donors, so as to preclude the possibility of the Organization being financially blackmailed. Under these conditions, expelling Russia or restricting its prerogatives is possible, though not guaranteed.

The essay was submitted to the #UnRussiaUN competition of the Pylyp Orlyk Foundation. The competition winners were announced in Kyiv at a special awards ceremony.