Can Russia Be Expelled from the UN? — An Essay by Ruslana Kistechok

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24, 2022, once again confronted the international community with a fundamental question: how can an aggressor state retain the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power, and use that power to block any international response to its own crimes? Answering the question of whether Russia can be expelled from the UN requires analysing at least three dimensions: the legal grounds for challenging its membership, the mechanisms provided for in the UN Charter, and extra-Charter pathways that could realistically lead to Russia’s removal from the key bodies of the Organisation.

Russia in the UN: Membership Without Legal Basis

Article 23 of the UN Charter explicitly names five permanent members of the Security Council, and among them — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but not the Russian Federation [10]. Nevertheless, on December 24, 1991, Russia assumed the Soviet seat without any formal vote in UN bodies — solely on the basis of a letter from RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin and the tacit acquiescence of the Secretariat [16]. The decision of the CIS Council of Heads of State of December 21, 1991, which Russia cites as its legal basis, is a purely political declaration: it was not registered with the UN Secretariat under Article 102 of the Charter, contains no legally binding norms, and cannot in any way substitute for the admission procedure prescribed by the Charter [7].

The core legal problem is that Russia invoked the concept of a “continuator state” without justification: the complete and unambiguous dissolution of the USSR, documented in the Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS of December 8, 1991, precludes any identity between the USSR and any post-Soviet state [12]. All 15 former Soviet republics, including Russia, recognised the USSR as having ceased to exist as a subject of international law. Russia is therefore one of the successor states and should have undergone the standard UN accession procedure — as, for example, the Czech Republic and Slovakia did after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, or Serbia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia [11]. Russia’s occupation of the USSR’s seat on the Security Council thus occurred in the absence of any transparent decision by the principal UN organs, which in itself contravenes the Charter of the Organisation [4].

Charter Barriers and the Institutional Trap

The UN Charter contains two formal grounds for restricting membership. Article 5 allows the suspension of the rights and privileges of a member against whom the Security Council has taken preventive or enforcement action. Article 6 provides for the expulsion of a member that has persistently violated the principles of the Charter, by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council [10]. However, both provisions contain the same structural trap: the Security Council’s recommendation is subject to the veto of its permanent members — that is, Russia itself. Russia will never voluntarily vote for its own expulsion. This vicious circle is the principal institutional barrier that must be overcome through alternative pathways.

Five Realistic Pathways to Russia’s Removal

The first and most promising pathway from a legal standpoint is to challenge the legitimacy of Russia’s UN membership rather than raise the question of its “expulsion.” If Russia was never legitimately admitted to the Organisation through the procedure prescribed by the UN Charter, the question is not one of expulsion but of establishing the absence of any legal basis for its continued presence [6]. It was precisely this approach that Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Serhii Kyslytsya, proposed, emphasising that “Russia is not a member of the UN Security Council,” having assumed the seat without following established procedures [3]. The General Assembly, guided by the precedent of Resolution 2758 of October 25, 1971 on the representation of China, has already adopted decisions on the membership of a permanent Security Council member without a Security Council recommendation and even bypassing the qualified majority requirement [9]. This precedent demonstrates that the General Assembly possesses the necessary authority and legal instruments to resolve questions of UN representation. If a sufficient number of states withdraw their support for the 1991 CIS decision and raise the question of the legitimacy of Russia’s membership, this could initiate a formal review in the General Assembly, where Russia has no veto.

The second pathway is the application of the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism, established by UN General Assembly Resolution 377(V) of 1950. Under this mechanism, if the Security Council, due to lack of unanimity among its permanent members, fails to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of peace, the General Assembly convenes in emergency special session within 24 hours and considers the situation with a view to making recommendations for collective measures [8]. This mechanism has already been activated with respect to Ukraine: the emergency special session of 2022 gathered 141 votes in favour of a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression [21]. While Assembly recommendations are not legally binding, they carry significant political and reputational weight and can serve as the basis for further decisions. Moreover, the International Court of Justice, in its 1962 advisory opinion, confirmed that the General Assembly has broad powers in the field of peace maintenance, including the establishment of peacekeeping forces that go beyond purely recommendatory functions [8].

The third pathway is the amendment of the UN Charter through the convening of a General Conference under Article 109. To convene such a conference, a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly and nine (out of fifteen) votes in the Security Council are sufficient — without requiring unanimity among the permanent members [6]. Such a conference could address: the limitation or abolition of the veto in cases where a permanent member is a party to a conflict; the introduction of Charter-compliance criteria as a condition for retaining permanent membership; and the expansion of the Security Council’s composition. Amendments enter into force after ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all permanent members of the Security Council — which again raises the veto problem. However, if Russia is deemed an illegitimate UN member, the argument about its veto right in ratifying amendments may also be challenged.

The fourth pathway is the restoration of the practice of mandatory abstention under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. This provision requires that a permanent member that is a party to a dispute abstain from voting in the Security Council when decisions are made under Chapter VI [10]. Although this practice effectively fell into disuse after 2000, it remains legally valid. If the Security Council were to determine, through a procedural vote, that Russia is a party to a dispute, Russia would be obliged to abstain from voting, allowing decisions on Ukraine to be adopted without its participation. This would not by itself exclude Russia from the UN, but it would significantly curtail its ability to abuse the veto in matters directly relating to its own aggression.

The fifth pathway — the most radical and long-term — is the creation of a new international organisation with an updated Charter that does not provide for the right of veto or substantially limits its application. The precedent of the dissolution of the League of Nations and the founding of the UN in 1945 demonstrates that such transformations, however extraordinarily complex, are possible [8]. If 140 or more UN member states were to venture the creation of a new organisation, Russia and China could either join it on new terms or remain outside it, but in neither case would their veto carry any legal force within the new structure.

The Role of the International Court of Justice and the Question of Coalitions

Deserving separate attention is whether the International Court of Justice could play a role in resolving the problem. Under Article 96 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly or the Security Council may request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on any legal question [9]. The subject of such a request could be the legality of Russia’s continuation of the USSR’s UN membership. Although an advisory opinion is not legally binding, it would carry enormous symbolic and legal weight, capable of transforming the diplomatic debate and lending legitimacy to further actions by the General Assembly.

Any of the pathways described requires a broad international coalition. The results of General Assembly votes show that a stable majority of 140–143 states is prepared to support resolutions condemning Russia’s actions [21]. At the same time, two-thirds of the world’s population is represented by states that abstained or voted against, including China and India, which are key members of BRICS+ and potential allies of Moscow [15]. Until these states change their positions, Russia’s complete international isolation remains unattainable through existing mechanisms. However, full unanimity is not required to initiate procedures in the General Assembly: a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is sufficient, and that majority is realistically achievable [6].

Another practical lever is the challenge to Russia’s position in the financial and specialised bodies of the UN. The precedent of Russia’s expulsion from the UN Human Rights Council in April 2022 by a General Assembly decision (93 votes in favour, 24 against, 58 abstentions) demonstrated that even without a Security Council recommendation or in the face of a veto, the General Assembly is capable of adopting decisions that strip Russia of specific rights and statuses within the UN system [9]. This experience constitutes an important precedent and may be extended to other bodies.

Conclusions: The Will to Change Matters More Than the Instruments

The question “is it possible to expel Russia from the UN” is therefore not purely rhetorical. Formal expulsion through the standard procedure under Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter is blocked by the right of veto — and this is precisely the fundamental defect of the UN that Russia actively exploits. Yet alongside this route there exist genuine legal alternatives: challenging the legitimacy of Russia’s membership in the General Assembly, activating the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism, initiating an ICJ advisory opinion, reforming the Charter through Article 109, and restoring the practice of mandatory abstention under Article 27(3).

None of these pathways is straightforward: each requires time, broad diplomatic support, and strategic consistency. Yet inaction is equally costly: a Security Council unable to stop the aggression of its own permanent member undermines the very idea of collective security, as well as the legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN as such [18]. The most significant systemic changes in international law occur after wars — and it is precisely Russia’s defeat in the war against Ukraine that could serve as the catalyst for a fundamental revision of the architecture of global security. In this sense, the question is not only whether it “is possible” to expel Russia from the UN, but whether the international community will summon the will and determination to use the instruments that already exist.

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as we previously reported, the #UnRussiaUN student essay competition brought together young researchers from across Ukraine who are exploring legal pathways to Russia’s accountability.