The Problem of Legitimacy of the Russian Federation’s Presence in the UN
Prepared by: Myroslav Andriiovych Mykhalchyn, fourth-year student of the Faculty of Law at the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
“The United Nations was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save it from hell” — Dag Hammarskjöld
The modern architecture of collective security, established in the aftermath of World War II, is currently undergoing profound destabilization. Russia’s full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine has catalyzed an existential crisis within the United Nations, exposing the functional incapacity of the Security Council (SC) in the domain of international peace maintenance. The situation in which a permanent SC member acts as the direct perpetrator of aggression while wielding the veto to block resolutions aimed at restoring another state’s sovereignty reflects a critical erosion of the Organization’s legal norms.
Within contemporary academic discourse, the question of the legitimacy of Russia’s membership in the UN has grown increasingly urgent. A well-grounded thesis holds that a fundamental contradiction exists between Russia’s formal status and its destructive conduct, which runs counter to the provisions of the UN Charter. The question of stripping Russia of its membership or curtailing its powers is a complex legal problem, the resolution of which requires analysis of procedural norms and the development of new paradigms in international law.
The Procedural Usurpation of 1991
One of the foundational aspects of this inquiry concerns the legitimacy of the Russian Federation’s entry into the UN in 1991. Under Article 4 of the UN Charter, the procedure for admitting new members requires a decision by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Yet following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia assumed the seat of a permanent SC member without undergoing these prescribed steps — relying instead on Yeltsin’s letter of December 24, 1991, and the political consensus of world leaders at the time.
From a positivist standpoint, the Russian Federation and the USSR are distinct subjects of international law. The practice of automatically substituting one subject for another among the permanent members of the SC has no normative basis in the Charter. Article 23 of the UN Charter still names a state that no longer exists — the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” The absence of any formal amendment to the Charter text regarding the change of subject creates grounds for characterizing Russia’s current status as resting on procedural precedent rather than on a peremptory norm, which opens avenues for challenging its authority.
Furthermore, Article 4 imposes on member states the requirement of being “peace-loving.” Russia’s systematic disregard for decisions of the International Court of Justice and General Assembly resolutions calling for the cessation of aggression de facto strips it of compliance with this Charter criterion, casting doubt on the legitimacy of its continued participation in the Organization.
The Procedural Deadlock: The Veto Barrier
The mechanism for expelling a state from the UN is governed by Article 6 of the Charter, which provides for a General Assembly decision upon recommendation of the Security Council in cases of systematic violation of the Organization’s principles. However, the implementation of this norm runs into a “procedural deadlock”: any recommendation by the SC requires unanimous consent of all permanent members (Article 27).
This creates a deadlock in which the offending state possesses the tools to block punitive measures against itself. The principle of nemo judex in causa sua (no one may be a judge in their own case), while partly referenced in Article 27(3) with respect to the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI, carries no binding force in procedures of expulsion or enforcement measures under Chapter VII. This situation reveals a systemic flaw in the UN’s architecture — one that permits permanent members to engage in arbitrary impunity.
Alternative Mechanisms of Delegitimization
Given the procedural complexity of direct expulsion, the search for alternative mechanisms of delegitimizing Russia’s presence has gained renewed relevance.
First, consideration has been given to invoking the experience of the Credentials Committee. The 1974 precedent involving the Republic of South Africa demonstrated the possibility of suspending a delegation’s participation in the work of the General Assembly by refusing to recognize its credentials. Such a step does not annul a state’s membership as such, but deprives it of the right of representation and voting — an effective instrument of diplomatic isolation.
Second, structural reform of the Security Council is imperative. Contemporary initiatives — notably the concept of voluntary restraint of the veto in cases of mass atrocities (the France-Mexico initiative) and proposals for expanding SC membership — are aimed at overcoming the Organization’s functional paralysis. A full abolition of the veto right, or the introduction of a mechanism allowing the General Assembly to override it by a qualified majority, is seen as the strategic path toward restoring the balance of power.
Third, there is historical precedent in the expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations in 1939. While the legal frameworks of the two organizations differ, that act affirmed the priority of international legality over political expediency.
Geopolitical Caveats
The scenario of expelling Russia is accompanied by significant geopolitical caveats. On one hand, stripping the aggressor of its authority would help restore confidence in international institutions and prevent future conflicts — securing the triumph of the rule of law over the law of force.
On the other hand, a number of Global South states and some permanent SC members have expressed concern about the complete dismantling of a universal platform for dialogue. There is a risk that pushing a nuclear power beyond the legal framework of the UN could lead to unpredictable escalation. Yet it appears evident that preserving the status quo poses an even greater threat — the ultimate discrediting and collapse of the UN as a guarantor of global stability.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the question of expelling the Russian Federation from the UN lies at the intersection of legal formalism and the political will of the international community. Despite the difficulty of overcoming the “veto barrier,” there are substantial legal grounds for challenging the legitimacy of Russia’s presence on the Security Council — given the violations of succession procedures in 1991 and non-compliance with the criteria set out in Article 4 of the Charter.
The transformation of the UN is an inevitable condition for the survival of the international legal order. Ukraine’s role in this context consists in the consistent advancement of initiatives to delegitimize the aggressor and reform the security mechanisms. The expulsion of the aggressor state must become not merely an act of political solidarity, but a step toward building a renewed system of international relations — one in which the veto is no longer synonymous with impunity, and membership in the Organization directly correlates with adherence to the principles of peace and respect for sovereignty.
Synopsis
Legal Dimensions of Suspending the Russian Federation’s Membership in the UN
This essay provides a comprehensive legal analysis of the legitimacy of the Russian Federation’s continued presence within the United Nations system. The author argues that Russia’s 1991 assumption of the USSR’s seat constituted a “procedural usurpation” rather than a formal legal succession, as it bypassed the mandatory admission requirements outlined in Article 4 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, the persistent violation of the “peace-loving state” criterion fundamentally undermines the basis for Russia’s membership.
The paper critically examines the “Veto Deadlock” within Article 6, emphasizing the procedural contradiction where an aggressor state can effectively block its own expulsion. The author explores alternative legal avenues, such as challenging credentials through the Credentials Committee — with reference to the 1974 South African precedent — and broader systemic reforms of the Security Council. The conclusion asserts that delegitimizing the Russian Federation is not merely a political necessity but a vital step toward preserving the integrity of international law and ensuring that the UN does not suffer the same fate as the League of Nations.
Sources
Legal Acts and Official Documents
Charter of the United Nations: International document of June 26, 1945. Edition of September 16, 2005. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_010.
Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the Illegitimacy of the Russian Federation’s Presence on the UN Security Council and the United Nations as a Whole. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. 2022. December 26. URL: mfa.gov.ua.
Commentary by the MFA on the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution “Support for sustainable peace in Ukraine.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. 2026.
Commentary by the MFA of Ukraine on the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on forced displacements from Ukrainian territory occupied by the Russian Federation. Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN. 2026.
Ukraine has blocked Russia’s membership in the IMO Council for 2026–2027. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 2025.
Academic Articles and Expert Materials
Mahmutovic A. Did Russia Invade International Law in Ukraine. Access to Justice in Eastern Europe. 2023. Special Issue. P. 23–39. DOI: 10.33327/AJEE-18-6S003.
Maurer D. A U.N. Security Council Permanent Member’s De Facto Immunity From Article 6 Expulsion: Russia’s Fact or Fiction? Lawfare. 2022. April 15. URL: lawfaremedia.org.
Liniova I. When Law Becomes an Obstacle: The Problem of the UN Security Council Veto. Yurydychna Hazeta. 2026. April 6. URL: yur-gazeta.com.
Merezhko O. How to Expel Russia from the UN? Yurydychna Hazeta. 2022. May 26. URL: yur-gazeta.com.
Exclusion of Russia from the United Nations Security Council. UkrainianLawFirms. 2022. May 23. URL: ukrainianlawfirms.com.
Media and News Agency Publications
Ukraine Initiates Process of Expelling Russia from the UN — MFA Statement. Yevropeyska Pravda. 2022. December 26. URL: eurointegration.com.ua.
International Law Allows Expelling Countries from the UN — Polish MFA on Ukraine’s Initiative. Yevropeyska Pravda. 2022. December 28. URL: eurointegration.com.ua.
Finland’s President Proposes Expelling Russia from the UN Security Council. Ukrinform. 2024. September 18. URL: ukrinform.ua.
Vons R. Ukraine Initiates Amendments to the IAEA Statute Following Russian Strikes. Glavkom. 2026. February 3. URL: glavcom.ua.
Ukraine Initiates Revision of RF Participation Approaches in International Organizations, Including the IAEA. Interfax-Ukraine. 2026. March 4. URL: interfax.com.ua.
Verkhovna Rada Establishes Inter-Faction Group to Work on Stripping Russia of Permanent SC Membership with Veto Right. Interfax-Ukraine. 2026. February 27. URL: interfax.com.ua.
Is It Possible to Expel a Terrorist State from the UN? Uryadovyi Kurier. 2026. April 8. URL: ukurier.gov.ua.
General Assembly voted today to suspend South Africa’s participation. The New York Times. 1974. November 12.
Reference and Archival Materials
General Assembly Decides to Suspend South Africa from Participation in Its Work. UN Photo. 1974. November 12. URL: unmultimedia.org.
Expulsion from the United Nations. Wikipedia. URL: wikipedia.org.
